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Mortgage Reform and the






n February 11, 2011, the Treasury Department, along with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) released
a white paper to Congress outlining the administration’s proposals
for reforming the housing ﬁnance market. The plan calls for private markets
to serve as the primary sources of mortgage credit and bear the burden for
losses, while requiring ﬁnancial institutions to adhere to more conservative
underwriting standards that require homeowners to hold more equity in their
homes. Theplanalsocallsforrestructuringthegovernment’slong-termrolein
the housing ﬁnance system and ensuring access to quality, affordable housing
for the underserved.
The white paper lays out three different reform options. In the ﬁrst op-
tion, the government creates a reinsurance program that guarantees mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) during a crisis. Under this approach, a group of
private mortgage companies provides guarantees for MBS that meet certain
strictunderwritingcriteria. Thegovernmentchargesapremiumforitsreinsur-
ance that is used to offset losses, guarantees only the MBS after the mortgage
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entities take losses, and does not backstop the entities’ debt. In this model,
the federal government still provides the backstop for the private guarantors.
In a second option, the government stays out of the mortgage market al-
most entirely, retaining the Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) in support
of housing programs for low-income households. A third option also reduces
the government’s role, but maintains a guarantee mechanism that expands in
down markets to serve as a backstop if private capital withdraws.
Despite their substantial differences, all three proposals retain a signiﬁ-




reason, it is vital that discussions surrounding mortgage ﬁnance reform con-
sider what role the FHA will play in the new regime.
The goal of this article is to make two points relevant to assessing what
role the FHA should play. First, when the national housing market declines,
the federal government typically supports mortgage lending and, since the
FHA is part of the federal government, it will in all likelihood play a major
role in this effort. Second, one of the FHA’s missions is to lend to low-
and moderate-income households, and it does this partly by allowing for low
down payments. When house prices drop, many of these loans will end up
withnegativeequity, thatis, aborrowerwillowemorethanhishouseisworth,
and it is well documented that negative equity is the most important factor in
default. Consequently, the FHA’s exposure to risk will increase. Whether
countercyclical mortgage lending by the federal government is good policy is
an open question and one that I do not take a stand on. Nevertheless, it should
be clear that if such a lending policy permits low down payments during a
declining housing market, the costs of such a policy may be signiﬁcant.
The next section provides a brief description of the FHA and its Mutual
Mortgage Insurance fund (MMI fund). Section 2 illustrates the risks to coun-
tercyclical lending by providing estimates of negative equity in a sample of
FHA-endorsed mortgages from Florida. Florida is not representative of the
rest of the country; indeed, its housing market is in signiﬁcantly worse shape
than many other states, but it is a useful case study because house price dy-
namics are very strong there and the availability of public house price data
allows me to estimate county-level price indexes. Section 3 concludes with a
discussion of policy implications.
1 In that same month (June 2010), FHA mortgages accounted for more than 47 percent of
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1. THE COUNTERCYCLICAL ROLE OF THE FHAAND
READING THE TEA LEAVES OF RISK IN THE MMI FUND
Background on the FHA
The FHA provides mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-approved
lenders for single-family and multifamily homes, including manufactured
homes, along with hospitals. The most popular program—known as Sec-
tion 203(b)—offers 15- and 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages for single-family
dwellings. Since the focus of this program is creating access for underserved
or targeted populations, FHA loans go to low- or moderate-income borrowers
and those with insufﬁcient or poor credit to qualify for prime loans. Given
the targeted population, Congress limits the size of mortgages the FHA can
insure based on an area’s median home price. The main advantages of a FHA
versus prime rate conventional loan with private mortgage insurance is that
the credit-qualifying criteria for a borrower are not as strict as the criteria
required to qualify for conventional loan ﬁnancing, and the down payment
or equity requirements can be signiﬁcantly lower. FHA mortgage insurance
provides lenders with protection against losses resulting from homeowner de-
faults. The cost of the mortgage insurance is borne by the homeowner and
typically is included in the monthly payment. In most cases, the insurance
cost is eliminated after ﬁve years or when the loan-to-value ratio falls to 78
percent of the value of the property.
The FHA was created in 1934 to deal with the decline in the housing mar-
ket. Aseriesofeventsthatledtothebankingcrisesofthe1930s, coupledwith
high unemployment, resulted in widespread housing foreclosures in a fash-
ion similar to what has been experienced recently. For example, the collapse
of the housing market was so severe that new construction starts decreased
from more than 700,000 per year throughout the 1920s to only 93,000 in 1933
(Vandell 1995).
This countercyclical role for the FHA is also evident in events of the
1980s. As home values fell and private mortgage insurers pulled back, the
FHA served as a backstop by providing loans. As a result, in the 1980s the
fund lost close to $6 billion, and its economic value declined from 5.3 percent
of insurance-in-force to less than 1 percent (Henderschott andWaddell 1992).
MuchofthislosscanbeattributedtotheFHA’sresponsetoananemichousing
market and a persistent recession. The FHA’s policies to stimulate residential
mortgageactivitycanbeallocatedintothreecategories. First,therewasashift
from the traditional annual insurance premium to a one time upfront premium
thattheborrowercouldamortizeintothemortgage. Second,theFHAlowered
the down payments on qualifying loans from 10 percent to 3 percent. Third,
the FHA relaxed underwriting standards on the borrower and the property. In
all three cases the safety of the loans was reduced, stimulating the probability
of increased defaults in a sluggish market. The increase in defaults raised
concerns of possible insolvency in the MMI fund at that time.98 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In response to the deterioration of the MMI fund, Congress passed the
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) in 1990.
Among other things, this act mandated that the MMI fund maintain a cap-
ital ratio of at least 2 percent. The capital ratio, as deﬁned in NAHA, is the
ratio of the fund’s capital or economic net worth to its unamortized insurance-
in-force.
During the 1990s, the FHA retained a signiﬁcant market share (Ambrose
and Pennington-Cross 2000). Afterward, however, its share dramatically de-
clined from 19 percent in 1996 to 4 percent in 2005, with most of the decline
occurring after 2001 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
2010a). During this period its market share was taken by the large increase in
high-risk private lending (e.g.,Alt-A, interest only, subprime, etc.), as well as
partially by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Jaffee and Quigley 2010).
In the last few years, as high-risk private lending collapsed, the FHA’s
market share dramatically rose; in 2010 it was more than 33 percent (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010b). As in the 1980s,
underwriting criteria were relaxed in response to the downturn in the market.
For example, in 2008, mortgage loan limits were increased by at least 25
percent, with high cost areas (e.g., Hawaii, California) increasing to as high
as $729,750 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2008).
Asaconsequenceofthesepolicies, theFHAhasexperiencedcreditlosses
inrecentvintageofloans. HUD’sbudgetfortheFHAfor2008–2011included
shortfalls stemming from the FHA insurance program. This was the ﬁrst time
in three decades that HUD made a request to Congress for taxpayer support
of the FHA (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010b).
TheGovernmentAccountabilityOfﬁceisprojectingtaxpayerfundedsub-
sidies of half a billion dollars through 2011 (U.S. GovernmentAccountability
Ofﬁce 2010). For 2009, the FHA’s budget includes expenses related to de-
faulted loans in excess of receipts from borrowers’ insurance premiums in
2010, requiring additional appropriations for operations. The next section
provides more details on the operation of the MMI fund. As the FHA contin-
uestoexpanditspresenceandlikewiseitsportfolioofinsuranceendorsements,
it is useful to examine the threats to future solvency as both market recovery
and legislative reform of mortgage markets appear to be on a slow trajectory.
The State of the MMI Fund and Threats to
FHA Solvency
The MMI fund insures mortgages on single-family homes consisting primar-
ily of detached houses and townhouses (Herzog 2010).2 The largest portion
of the MMI fund consists of mortgage insurance provided under the FHA’s
2 In October 2008, insurance on new originations for condominium units was added to the
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Section 203(b) program, which is for one- to four-family residences. Under
the 203(b) program, any person able to meet the cash investment, mortgage
payments, and credit requirements may obtain a loan insured by the FHA
from a private lending institution to purchase a home. The MMI fund also
contains other single-family mortgage programs like condominium endorse-
ments issued after 2008 but previously insured under Section 234(c), Section
203(k) purchase and rehabilitation, and Section 255 home equity conversion
mortgages.
While the FHA has other insurance funds, the bulk of FHA mortgage
endorsements are insured under its MMI fund.3 As of January 2011, the
FHA insured more than 6.8 million mortgages with an outstanding balance of
$947.8 billion (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2011).
The MMI fund maintains liquidity in its insurance programs primarily by
generating premium, fee, and interest income, but also through U.S. Treasury
borrowing and Congressional appropriations if needed.
TheMMIfundiscomprisedoftwocoreaccounts: aﬁnancingaccountand
a capital reserve account. The ﬁnancing account is the main reserve account
and is required to hold reserves equal to the present value of net losses pro-
jected over the next 30 years. To the extent the reserves exceed the net present
value cost of the loan guarantees, these excess funds are paid to the capital
reserve account. If the present value estimated net losses exceed the reserves,
funds are paid from the capital reserve account to make up the difference.
Thisissomewhatanalogoustoacheckingandsavingsaccount. Theﬁnancing
account holds reserves, pays default claims or other losses, and receives any
payments received from the public; the capital reserve account holds surplus
cash (Stevens 2009; Sullivan 2010). The needed reserves are estimated annu-
ally based on a yearly review of economic conditions and projections. Then
the cost of outstanding loan guarantees are reevaluated, and the amount of
reserves held in the ﬁnancing account are adjusted to ensure there are sufﬁ-
cientresourcestocoverthenetpresentvalueofestimatedcostsofoutstanding
guarantees.
The accounting for the MMI fund uses the term “economic value” of the
fund. Economic value is a combination of the current cash available to the
fund,plusthenetpresentvalueofallfuturecashinﬂowsandoutﬂowsexpected
toresultfromtheoutstandingmortgagesinthefund. Currentcapitalresources
are largely composed of nonmarketable Treasury securities, cash ﬂows into
the fund from premiums, and the sale of foreclosed properties. Outﬂows
includeclaimsonforeclosedmortgages, premiumrefunds, andadministrative
expenses. Estimating the net present value of future cash ﬂows is an actuarial
3 The FHA operates ﬁve insurance funds. The other funds are the General Insurance fund,
the Special Risk Insurance fund, the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance fund, and the
Hope for Homeowners fund.100 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 The Erosion of the ReserveAccount
Capital Ratio (%)








































































Notes: The data for this chart have been extracted from the FHA actuarial reviews from
2007–2009, and from the FHA Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Management Report (Integrated
Financial Engineering, Inc. 2007, 2008, 2009). The capital ratio (left y axis), or reserve
ratio, is the Congressionally restricted (2 percent minimum) reserve requirement repre-
senting the percent of the MMI fund’s amortized insurance-in-force that is available for
covering claims. The bars represent the dollar value of the capital reserve account. The
MMI fund, statutorily bound to solvency, carries a deﬁcit as of 2009.
exercise based on assumptions about future economic conditions, including
predictions of mortgage foreclosures and prepayment.4
The law requires the capital ratio to be at least 2 percent in order for the
MMIfundtobeconsideredactuariallysound. Figure1indicatesthat, overthe
observation period, the capital ratio reached as high as 7 percent. The capital
reserve account, however, has been depleted from more than $3.1 billion to
deﬁcit levels as of 2009, and continued deﬁcits are projected through 2011.
Excessive defaults threaten the capital ratio and will likely result in HUD
submitting additional requests to Congress for appropriations to stabilize the
4 Capital in this context refers to the economic net worth of the MMI fund, as determined
by the annual audit.B. C Smith: FHA’s Countercyclical Role 101
Figure 2 The Economic Value of Insurance-in-Force
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Notes: The data for this chart has been extracted from the FHA actuarial reviews from
2007–2009 (Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. 2007, 2008, 2009). The economic
value (left y axis) represents an estimated present value of the expected cash ﬂows to
be derived from the outstanding insurance-in-force at the end of each ﬁscal year. This
estimate accounts for prepayment and default projections, the calculations of which are
provided in the actuarial report for 2009. The value of new loans (right y axis) is the
total endorsements for each year based on the appraised value at origination.
MMI fund. In fact, projections from the FHA indicate the 2 percent threshold
will not be attainable before 2012, and this estimate is based on a model
predicting a modest recovery pace (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development 2010b).
Figure 2 further suggests that the recent expansion of business for the
FHA has increased the instability of the MMI fund. The nominal or appraised
valueofnewloansoriginatedisplottedagainsttheeconomicvalueoftheMMI
fund. Duringthegrowthperiodofthesubprimemarket,theeconomicvalueof
the fund was relatively unchanged (there was a low level of insurance claims
during the period), while the value of new endorsements fell (as volume fell).
In 2007, however, the value of new loans grew with the expansion of new
endorsements. The economic value of the fund, composed of the discounted
value of the expected cash ﬂows, fell dramatically. This is in response to the102 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Economic Value of New Business

























































































Notes: The data for this chart has been extracted from the FHA actuarial reviews
from 2007–2009 (Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. 2007, 2008, 2009). The total
insurance-in-force (left y axis) represents the total exposure of the MMI fund to claims.
The value of new book (right y axis) represents the estimated value of the current en-
dorsements. Clearly the trend for value is downward, while the exposure is increasing
rapidly as the FHA assumes a renewed presence in the mortgage market.
increased threat from defaults and the inclusion of lower quality (higher risk)
loans.
One measure of the fund’s ﬁnancial soundness is the MMI capital ratio,
which is the ratio of the economic value of the MMI fund to the balance
of the MMI insurance-in-force (Figure 3). In ﬁscal year 2008, the estimated
economicvalueoftheMMIfunddecreasedwiththeforecastofexpectedhous-
ing value declines. Conversely, the total MMI insurance-in-force increased
signiﬁcantly because of the value of new endorsements. The combination of
these factors resulted in the decrease in the capital ratio previously illustrated.
This is expected as the volume of loans is increasing. More seriously, the
expected value of new loans made during declining property values, partic-
ularly in 2009, has a negative cumulative value. Taken together, these ﬁrstB. C Smith: FHA’s Countercyclical Role 103
three ﬁgures illustrate an account that is under ﬁnancial stress because of
countercyclical lending.
2. RISK IN THE FHA POOLAT THE LOCAL LEVEL
It is well documented that house values impact default rates. Epperson et
al. (1985) initiated a long discussion of the inﬂuences that changing house
valuesandtheloan-to-value(LTV)ratiohadonthedecisionoftheborrowerto
exercise the default option. In this initial study, the authors looked backward
to the point of origination and identiﬁed changes in both the interest rate
charged and the house price as the two most important variables outside of the
borrower’s asset position. In a study of the recent housing bubble, Gerardi,
Shapiro, and Willen (2007) ﬁnd that, despite the increasing prevalence and
availability of subprime loans in Massachusetts from 2004–2006, the main
factor in the increase in foreclosures was the drop in house prices. In more
recent work,Archer and Smith (forthcoming) conﬁrm that the put option, the
optionofdefaultingonamortgagewithnegativeequity,isthemostsigniﬁcant
factor in models of default. They also observe that the marginal effect of LTV
on default potential increases by factors as high as four depending on the level
of LTV.
The recent large drop in house prices and the FHA’s policy of allowing
low down payments means that a sizable number of recent FHA mortgages
have negative equity and are then more likely to default. The quantitative size
of this effect is a subject of some debate.
Every year, the FHA commissions an actuarial report on the ﬁnancial
statusoftheMMIfundandreportsitsresultstoCongress(IntegratedFinancial
Engineering, Inc. 2010). The 2009 report estimated that the FHA would not
need any form of government support. Aragon et al. (2010) criticized the
actuarial study, arguing that it underestimated future losses to the MMI fund.
Oneoftheirkeycriticismsisthat,forvariousmethodologicalanddatareasons,
theactuarialreviewunderestimatedthenumberofborrowerswhohadnegative
equity and were subject to economic shocks like unemployment, particularly
from “streamline” reﬁnances. A FHA streamline reﬁnance is essentially a
modiﬁcation of an existing FHA loan into a lower interest rate and extended
term. TheremaybegoodreasonsfordoingthissincetheFHAalreadyownsthe
credit risk, but in terms of estimating default rates, the actuarial review treated
the original loan as paid in full and the reﬁnance as a fresh loan. Aragon et al.
(2010) rightfully argue that this procedure is subject to signiﬁcant selection
biasesintheestimation. The2010reportcorrectsforsome,butnotall,oftheir
criticisms. The 2010 numbers report substantial losses on loans originated
when house prices were dropping, namely in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The
actuarial review still estimates that the fund is solvent, but a lot of that income
comes from loans made in 2010, when house prices had stopped falling, the104 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Estimated LTV Distribution Percentage of Outstanding Loans
in Florida Loan Sample by Quarter
Quarter 0–80 81–95 96–100 100–110 Over 110 Index Change
2003:Q1 14.05 35.15 50.80 0.00 0.00
2003:Q2 15.19 59.17 25.64 0.00 0.00 0.0215
2003:Q3 17.55 61.14 20.66 0.60 0.05 0.0291
2003:Q4 19.13 59.24 21.34 0.25 0.04 0.0369
2004:Q1 12.86 51.45 35.69 0.00 0.00 0.0148
2004:Q2 18.32 66.08 15.60 0.00 0.00 0.0406
2004:Q3 42.04 51.99 5.95 0.00 0.02 0.1263
2004:Q4 42.25 47.97 9.68 0.03 0.07 0.1256
2005:Q1 65.17 25.47 9.36 0.00 0.00 0.1957
2005:Q2 49.47 39.14 11.39 0.00 0.00 0.1622
2005:Q3 28.57 45.38 26.05 0.00 0.00 0.0306
2005:Q4 35.42 48.01 16.49 0.00 0.08 0.0460
2006:Q1 32.08 42.92 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.0257
2006:Q2 30.84 45.87 23.21 0.08 0.00 0.0344
2006:Q3 30.71 36.07 33.22 0.00 0.00 0.0093
2006:Q4 27.67 41.22 28.56 2.55 0.00 0.0054
2007:Q1 22.47 25.99 29.07 12.34 10.13 −0.0407
2007:Q2 19.88 38.64 37.50 2.84 1.14 −0.0062
2007:Q3 19.49 38.24 39.48 2.79 0.00 0.0350
2007:Q4 22.39 33.13 37.47 6.40 0.61 0.0180
2008:Q1 14.13 38.59 43.20 4.08 0.00 −0.0043
2008:Q2 9.60 33.91 37.38 18.00 1.11 −0.0258
2008:Q3 11.45 35.78 40.61 9.30 2.86 −0.0152
2008:Q4 33.30 19.34 13.79 13.57 20.00 −0.0405
2009:Q1 31.63 22.65 13.78 11.27 20.67 −0.0315
2009:Q2 21.82 22.78 16.69 17.76 20.95 −0.0722
2009:Q3 14.99 23.99 23.72 20.46 16.84 −0.0745
Notes: The outstanding loans in the sample (from the LPS database) are distributed across
ﬁve loan-to-value categories by quarter of observation. The proportion of loans with neg-
ative equity clearly expands over the observation period with more than 30 percent of the
loans in negative equity territory over the most recent four quarters of observation. The
index used to estimate the market value used in computing the LTV will be presented
in the next section.
quality of the average FHA borrower was higher, and the FHA had raised its
premia (Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. 2010).
The risks of lending in a market when house prices are declining is
enhanced in the current economic environment, where trigger events such
as unemployment are more likely. Consider the observations available from
Tables 1 and 2.5
5 In recent policy reforms, the challenges posed by Aragon et al. (2010) have been addressed
in the annual audit and forecasting of the MMI fund, but there are unresolved obstacles with scale
and the conclusions that can be rendered from available data.B. C Smith: FHA’s Countercyclical Role 105
In Table 1, a sample of FHA-insured mortgage loans from the state of
Florida are distributed across ﬁve LTV categories by the quarter of observa-
tion.6 TheLTVwasestimatedbyusingloanamountsandadjustinghouseval-
ues by county-level price indexes. Details on the LTV estimates are presented
in the Appendix. For example, of all the observed FHA loans outstanding in
theﬁrstquarterof2003,approximately51percenthadaLTVratiobetween96
percent and 100 percent. The proportion of loans with negative equity clearly
expands over the observation period, with more than 30 percent of the loans
in negative equity territory over the most recent four quarters of observation.
The last column in the table illustrates this relationship. The mean change in
the estimated value of the sample of houses in the mortgage data set indicates
that through 2006:Q4 the average price of housing in the sample was increas-
ing. A shift in the trend occurs in 2007:Q1 as average prices fall 4 percent.
The fall in prices is expressed in the dramatic increase in loans with LTVs
in excess of 100. Reﬁnancing and the initial spate of foreclosures serves to
lowertheproportionofoverleveragedloansin2007:Q2,butaspricescontinue
to fall and access to reﬁnancing options is reduced, that proportion gradually
increases to 37 percent by 2009:Q3.
The expansion of high LTV loans in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 occurred for
a number of reasons. First, according to FHA Commissioner David Stevens,
lenders migrated to the FHA after the subprime mortgage market collapsed.
Second, many borrowers looked to the FHA as a way to get out from under
their adjustable rate mortgage loans by reﬁnancing into a FHA-insured loan.
Third, average house prices across the country were at their height in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2007 and the LTV reﬂects the current, substantially lower values.
Table2providesatellingillustrationofthepotentialthreatsfromnegative
equity in the FHA loan portfolio, at least in Florida. The table includes only
those outstanding loans that have a LTV ratio in excess of 100 percent by
vintage (year of origination) and by the quarter when observed (empty cells
mean there are no loans from that vintage with LTVs in excess of 100 percent
in the quarter observed). For example, by the ﬁrst quarter of 2007, nearly
66 percent of all FHA-insured loans issued in 2006 that remained outstanding
heldamortgagebalanceinexcessoftheestimatedvalueoftheproperty. There
is clearly an increasing trend in the extent of negative equity. Fifty percent
of the loans from 2005 are under water three years post origination in 2008.
Additionally,thereisnostrongevidenceofimprovementasvintagesprogress.
For example, of the mortgages insured in 2008, more than 60 percent are in
excess of the value of the property in 2009. The challenges for the older
6 The loan data (from LPS Applied Analytics, Inc.) represent the servicing reports on anony-
mous ﬁrst mortgage loans insured by the FHA and aggregated to the ﬁve-digit zip code. The
sample of 88,959 mortgages is restricted to the state of Florida for loans originating between
2003 and 2009.106 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Negative Equity by Vintage Over Post-Crisis Quarters for
Florida Loan Sample





2008:Q1 67.60 35.48 0.33
2008:Q2 73.81 65.63 20.47
2008:Q3 20.00 50.00 80.60 71.14 12.58
2008:Q4 0.15 9.78 56.23 84.71 76.65 35.61
2009:Q1 0.45 8.80 53.50 86.87 80.74 36.02 1.16
2009:Q2 1.42 15.37 67.16 86.29 84.87 62.32 24.02
2009:Q3 1.93 21.55 72.75 89.30 88.91 75.87 31.82
Notes: This table shows the fraction of outstanding loans that have a loan-to-value ratio
in excess of 100 percent by vintage (year of origination) and by the quarter when ob-
served. Loans that pay off are not included in the denominator. For example, by the ﬁrst
quarter of 2007 nearly 66 percent of all FHA-insured loans issued in 2006 that remained
outstanding at that point held a mortgage balance in excess of the estimated value of the
property. The index used to estimate the market value used in computing the LTV is
presented in the Appendix.
vintages (i.e., 2005) are troubling as well given that mortgage default is likely
expectedtofalldramaticallyafterthreeyears(Ambrose,Buttimer,andCapone
1997).
The probability of default is greater when high LTV ratios are coupled
with negative trigger events such as unemployment (Gerardi, Shapiro, and
Willen 2007). There has been little effort to evaluate the risk of the FHA
portfolio, including current value information and local economic conditions.
The actuarial review covering 2009 attempted to measure the change in value
via the Federal Housing Finance Agency index and the 2010 review used
Moody’s Analytics quarterly forecasts for house prices at the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) level. Although a reasonable case can be made for
using MSA-level indexes, they will still miss considerable heterogeneity at
more localized levels. Aragon et al. (2010) discuss the existence of forecast
error, where they utilize a sample of FHA loans and recorded transaction
data for LosAngeles County to forecast the potential loss from default in the
streamline ﬁnance portion of the FHA portfolio. Utilizing the restriction that
streamlineﬁnancing(i.e.,FHAtoFHAreﬁnancing)canonlyoccurifthevalue
of the property equals or exceeds the new loan amount, Aragon et al. (2010)
illustrate the potential for underestimating the threat of default and potential
cost to the MMI fund from high LTV loans.B. C Smith: FHA’s Countercyclical Role 107
3. CONCLUSIONS
The Federal Housing Administration’s insurance-in-force has doubled over
the past two years and is projected to approach $1.5 trillion over the next ﬁve
years (Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. 2010). Despite clear signs of
strain in the FHA’s MMI fund, the 2009 and 2010 actuarial reviews indicate
that the FHA will not need any form of government support. It is too early
to tell whether this forecast will be correct. The future path of house prices
is undoubtedly a key factor since it affects the LTV. This article made some
simple estimates of negative equity based on estimated county-level house
priceindexesinFlorida. Floridaisnotarepresentativestate,sotheseestimates
should not be considered as a measure of the negative equity exposure of the
entireFHAfund;however,weuseditbecauseofourabilitytoestimatecounty-
level price indexes from public data sources, and it illustrates the risks of
lending in a falling market. The analysis gives a very rough sense of the costs
of a government agency playing a countercyclical lending role, particularly
when the agency traditionally makes low down-payment loans.
Current mortgage market reform proposals focus on the elimination of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the FHA and the private market assum-
ing expanded responsibility. However, the experience of the 1980s and, in
particular, the last few years makes it very clear that it is easy for the federal
governmenttogrowtheFHA;inalllikelihoodtheFHAwillserveasimilarrole
in future housing downturns. Countercyclical lending to low down-payment
borrowerswithweakcreditisinherentlyrisky. Idonottakeastandonwhether
this kind of lending is good policy, but I do think people need to be aware of
the costs of this role and take them into account when assessing the various
reform plans.
APPENDIX
County-level quarterly price indexes are created from a repeat sales model of
transactions recorded with the Florida county property appraisers (assessors)
over the observation period. The source for the local house price data is the
State of Florida Department of Revenue data ﬁles. These ﬁles contain data
on assessed value and, where appropriate, the last two sale prices for every
property in Florida. The loan level data on which LTVs are estimates is from
a sample prepared by LPS Analytics, Inc., representing the servicing reports
on anonymous, individual loans.
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Notes: The estimated quarterly sales price index for each county is plotted over the obser-
vation period extended to the second quarter 2010 for additional insight. The observed
counties in Florida exhibit similar trends, with rapid escalation into 2006 and then an
equally abrupt fall from that point forward. The differences in the degree of change
provide the variation that is observed in the results for the second model.
where Yp is the observed purchase price at time p, the initial transaction, and
Ys is the observed sales price at time s, the subsequent transaction, such that
(p<s ) . γ n is a vector of parameters to be estimated representing the house
price index for the nthtime period, and Dn is a dummy variable that is zero for
allquartersexcepts andp,andequals1fors and−1forp. e isanobservation
on a well-behaved disturbance term.
Quarterly indexes are created individually for each of 20 counties, be-
ginning with 2002:Q4 and continuing over the observation period. Figure
4 is the output from the repeat sales model showing the performance for
all 20 counties. Although the trends are generally the same for all counties
(up through 2006 with aggressive reductions from 2006:Q4), there is clearly
variance across the counties. For example, the price index model reveals that
St. Lucie County house sales prices increased more than 250 percent between
December 2002 and June 2006, while Collier County increased less than 180B. C Smith: FHA’s Countercyclical Role 109
percent over the same period. Additionally, prices in ﬁve counties observed
have fallen below 2003 estimates according to the model.
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